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Non-technical summary
The official view on ECB monetary policy claims that monetary decisions are based
solely on average data for the euro zone and that diverging regional developments
are disregarded. However, experience from other two tier central banks, theoretical
considerations as well as descriptive and anecdotal analyses suggest that this official
view cannot be accepted without empirical testing. 
A generalised monetary policy reaction function is developed which allows for an
influence of regional divergence. The empirical tests are based on reaction function
estimations using a modified Taylor rule and a probit model of interest rate
decisions for the first years of the euro area. Both tests are applied to three
specifications of ECB policy: a euro advocate rule (Council members take into
account solely aggregate euro zone data), a pure national rule (Council members
focus solely on national data) and an intermediate rule which allows for influences
from both aggregate eurozone and national data. The analyses lead to two important
results concerning the impact of national data on ECB monetary policy decisions:
First, while we were not able to clearly state whether a euro advocate or a pure
national view dominates the voting in the ECB Council, our results contained
different coefficients for both specifications. Thus, conventional Taylor rules that
rely solely on eurozone variables might be biased. Second, however, according to
the results of the ordered probit we find weak evidence for the hypothesis that ECB
Council members take into account divergences of national data from eurozone
averages. The results also suggest that the impact of regional data is more
pronounced for inflation than for output considerations (this is also supported by the
descriptive analysis).
The results further clarify that ignoring a potential national perspective may lead to a
serious bias in the estimation of ECB reaction functions. The paper concludes that
the correct identification of a possible impact of regional divergence is important for
the transparency issue.
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Abstract 
The official view on ECB monetary policy claims that monetary decisions are based
solely on average data for the euro zone and that diverging regional developments
are disregarded. However, experience from other two tier central banks and
theoretical considerations suggest that this official view cannot be accepted without
empirical testing. A generalised monetary policy reaction function is developed
which allows for an influence of regional divergence. The empirical tests are based
on reaction function estimations and a probit model of interest rate decisions for the
first years of the euro area. The results offer some first weak support for an impact
of regional divergence in ECB decision making. The results further clarify that
ignoring a potential national perspective may lead to a serious bias in the estimation
of ECB reaction functions. The paper concludes that the correct identification of a
possible impact of regional divergence is important for the transparency issue.
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11 Introduction
According to statements of ECB Council members decision making in the
Governing Council is based solely on the economic situation of the eurozone as a
whole whereas national divergences from the euro area averages are completely
ignored. A typical statement of this hypothesis is the following one by Wim
Duisenberg: “The members of the Governing Council consider the interests of the
euro area as a whole; they do not represent their respective countries” (Duisenberg,
2002b). Furthermore, Council members regularly reiterate the hypothesis that in the
Council’s discussions only euro area aggregate data play a role and that any national
bias is absent in decision making (Duisenberg, 2002a).
It is understandable that Council members communicate decision making of the
Council in a way that is consistent with the ECB’s mission of maintaining price
stability in the euro zone as a whole. What is less obvious, however, is whether this
view of Council members as pure European advocates describes the full reality of
the way monetary preferences are determined and decisions are taken in the Council.
As will be set out below experience with similar two level central banks in the US
and Germany hints at the relevance of divergence between aggregate and regional
data. Apart from this, doubts about the actual degree of ECB independence and
considerations about the role of public opinion in the national governors’ utility
function back the expectation that the specific national economic situation in a
Council member’s home country matters for his preferences. 
For the understanding of ECB decision making it is essential to know whether there
is an impact of divergence in national economic data: The correct identification of
the ECB’s reaction function is only possible if the relevant weighting of national
components for the calculation of euro area aggregates is known. The GDP
weighting applied in usual estimates of the reaction function is in line with the
ECB’s official claim but might not be consistent with the real decision process in the
Council. So these estimates could well be misspecified. This misspecification would
have serious consequences: Retrospective analyses of ECB decisions would result in
biased coefficients for the impact of inflation and growth on interest rate policy. The
bias would carry over to any forecast based on this misspecified reaction function. 
The issue is also of obvious relevance in the constitutional debate on the future
institutional design of the ESCB. If the regional view is indeed relevant the
monetary decisions based on the current “one country – one vote” rule would be
biased towards the preferences of small countries.  A monetary policy non-optimal
with regard to the euro area as a whole would be the outcome. This problem would
then aggravate after the EMU entry of small Eastern European countries.
With this background, it is the purpose of this paper to test for an impact of national
data on ECB decision making in the first years of the euro era. Although the analysis
2has its unavoidable limitations given the short euro time span we find anecdotal,
descriptive and econometric evidence that national divergence from euro area
averages matters in the Governing Council. 
We start with a comparative description of the ECB constitution and a literature
review (section 2). In section 3, we look at the utility function of ECB Governing
Council members where we try to identify possible channels for an impact of
regional data. We continue by developing a generalised reaction function allowing
for an independent regional impact (section 4). Section 5 presents relevant
descriptive data. The empirical centrepiece of our analysis with estimation of a
reaction function and an ordered probit is presented in section 5 before we end with
some conclusions (section 6).
2 ECB constitution and literature survey
The ECB, like the US Federal Reserve and the former Bundesbank, is a two-tier
central bank. Its Governing Council consists of an Executive Board as well as the
presidents of the national central banks. 
Table 1: Decision-making bodies of ECB, Fed and Bundesbank
European Central Bank US Federal Reserve Bank Pre-1999 Bundesbank
Governing Council Federal Open MarketCommittee (FOMC) Zentralbankrat
Executive
Board 
(6 members)
Presidents of
the 12
national
central banks
Board of
Governors 
(7 members)
5 Reserve
Bank
presidents*
Direktorium
(8 members)
Presidents of
the 9 regional
“Landeszen-
tralbanken”
  18 votes   12 votes   17 votes
regional votes 2
central  votes

regional votes 0.71
central  votes

regional votes  1.13
central  votes

*Rotation out of 11 regional federal reserve districts with a permanent seat of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. 
However, in difference to the US central bank, all presidents of the national
European central banks have permanent seats in the Governing Council.
Consequently, the regional aspects are relatively more pronounced in the ECB
Governing Council, i.e. the regions have relatively more voting power than the
centres (see also Berger and de Haan, 2002): while the ratio of regional votes per
centre votes is 0.71 for the Federal Reserve and 1.13 for the Bundesbank, the
corresponding ratio for the ECB is 2.
The influence of regional votes on the interest rate decisions of central banks has
attracted some interest in the economic literature recently. Aksoy et al. (2002)
3present an analysis how different decision making procedures would affect welfare.
They find that a euro-wide perspective is advantageous compared to a “nationalistic”
view in the ECB’s Governing Council. However, this study does not comment on
the empirical relevance of these different views.
In this sense, Meade and Sheats (2002) are closer to our approach. They focus on
US monetary policy and analyse the voting records of the monetary policy
committee. More precisely they estimate whether regional factors influence the
probability of a voter in the committee to dissent from the majority vote. Their
findings indicate that regional unemployment developments significantly influence
the decisions of the committee voters to dissent. Interestingly, the importance of
variables of the voters’ regional background was found to be more important for
board members located in the Washington, D.C. main office than for the regional
Bank presidents.
Berger and de Haan (2002) concentrate on voting behaviour in the Governing
Council (Zentralbankrat) of the former Bundesbank. They find that both inflation
differences and differences in real growth significantly influenced dissenting voting
behaviour, thereby supporting the findings of Meade and Sheats (2002) for the Fed.
Both Meade and Sheats (2002) as well as Berger and de Haan (2002) interpret their
findings with reference to the ECB. The former look at the distribution of inflation
rates across EMU countries in months prior to ECB decisions and find that the
direction of the interest rate change was compatible with the number of countries
that had inflation rates above or below the EMU inflation. The latter present stylised
facts about different preferences of voting members in the ECB Governing Council
(measures of conservativeness or political background) and also about diverging
economic developments in the eurozone.
While their analysis leads to first results they do not present hard evidence. Meade
and Sheats (2002) focus only on interest rate decisions of the ECB rather than
analysing whether their theory of regional influences is also able to explain ECB
behaviour in months without a change in interest rates.
Faust et al. (2001) provide a first attempt to uncover the monetary policy rule of the
ECB. In order to deal with the short time series available for ECB policy they
estimate a reaction function for the Bundesbank and simulate a potential path for the
ECB period using the estimated coefficients. They find that the actual ECB interest
rate is actually significantly below the fitted values of the Bundesbank benchmark
function. The authors try to explain the discrepancy with a voting scenario in the
Governing Council where Germany and France would dominate the decision
making. However, even using this extreme assumption does not account for the
difference of ECB and potential Bundesbank interest rates. They also simulate
individual interest rates across EMU countries using a Taylor rule with estimated
4coefficients for the Bundesbank and national data. In this way they show large
discrepancies across EMU countries. For example, the fitted interest rate for Ireland
was on average over six percentage points higher than the actual ECB interest rate.
3 ECB Council members and national divergence
The existing literature does rarely become explicit about what could be the
institutional and political-economic basis for national preferences of ECB’s
Governing Council members. We see different arguments. The first argument is
closely connected to the debate on the actual degree of policy independence of
Council members. If this independence is not perfect as authors like Vaubel (2002)
argue there is an immediate case for a regional bias in ECB decision making. The
literature on vote and popularity functions has established that national economic
data are of major importance for the reelection chances of incumbent governments.
The most important variables in this context are national unemployment, growth and
inflation (for a recent survey see Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). Hence, if national
governments have any influence on their country’s members in the Governing
Council, this influence would clearly open a channel for a regional bias in ECB
decision making. 
However, imperfect independence of ECB is not a necessary condition for an impact
of regional divergence. It might well be the case that members of the Governing
Council are particularly interested in the economic situation of their home country
even if they are indeed fully independent from national politics. It is plausible to
assume that public opinion on the performance of ECB policy matters in the utility
function of these individuals. In this context it is crucial to recognise important
characteristics of “European” public opinion: A pan-European public in the sense of
pan-European newspapers or television programmes does practically not exist.
Furthermore, national central bank governors are in the spotlight of their home
country’s and not other countries’ media. For instance, statements of governors from
Greece, Ireland or the Netherlands are hardly ever quoted in German newspapers or
television, while the president of Deutsche Bundesbank is a prominent person with
frequent coverage of his views in German media. These considerations suggest that
national public opinion about the ECB in the home country should matter much
more for a national central bank president than the “average” of public opinions in
eurozone countries. If the Irish or Dutch public is very concerned with a high
inflation rate this would not be without consequences for the evaluation of the Irish
or Dutch central bank president in the media of the specific country.
Of course, it is difficult to find direct evidence for these suggestions. Generally, the
members of the Governing Council adhere to the official rhetoric about the sole
importance of euro averages for monetary decisions. But some examples might be
helpful to illustrate the possible impact of the national situation: Ireland, for
5example, has been an EMU member country characterised by above average
inflation rates in the first years of the euro so that, from the Irish perspective,
monetary policy has been too expansionary. Faced with this problem in the Irish
media, the following quote of governor Maurice O’Connel in the Irish Independent
is interesting: 
“It’s no secret that we would prefer higher interest rates,” adding that apart from
being the fastest growth economy in the eurozone, Ireland also has the third highest
inflation rate. However, he went on to state that Ireland “must conform with what is
good for the euro area."
(Irish Independent, May 9, 2001)
Also revealing is a report concerning the Dutch governor, Nout Wellink, coming
also from a country with an above average inflation rate in the first years of the euro:
“It is correct that big countries have the tendency to vote according to their own
interests” Wellink said  ... He stated that there were often disagreements among the
six members of the ECB Executive Board. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 15, 2002, translated by the authors)
In addition, small countries’ national representatives in the Governing Council are
well aware of the fact that they have a voting power that is relatively large compared
to their GDP share. Klaus Liebscher, the president of the Austrian national bank
revealed this awareness in the following statement (this statement occurred before
the EMU start and thus before the Governing Council members have been trained to
adjust their terminology to the official view):
“As a smaller central bank, we have many opportunities ahead of us, being on the
ECB board where there is one person, one vote,” he said. “We will be able to
influence monetary policy in ways we could not until now.”
(The European, July 6, 1998)
So there is at least anecdotal evidence that there are national views in the Governing
Council and that these national views might even be present within the Executive
Board (see the Wellink quote).
Wim Duisenberg regularly reports in his press conferences subsequent to Governing
Council sessions that decisions had been reached without a formal vote. It must be
stressed that the absence of a formal vote (if true) is no evidence in favour of an
actual consensus of monetary views. If the discussion reveals each member’s
preferences a formal vote becomes redundant. Members of the Council who infer
from the debate that they belong to a minority should not be interested to make their
defeat formal in an explicit vote.
6Summing up, it seems reasonable to empirically test the hypothesis of a regional
bias in ECB decision making.
4 A generalised reaction function of a two-tier central bank
The preceding arguments can now be translated into a generalisation of standard
monetary reactions functions. Usually a reaction function is formulated for a central
bank’s Governing Council as a whole on the basis of aggregate data for the relevant
currency area. The typical example includes the well-known Taylor rule as in Taylor
(1993):
(1) * * *i r 0.5 ( ) 0.5 gap      
or equivalently
(1)’ *i   gap      with * *r 0.5 , 1.5 and 0.5       .
where i * denotes the preferred short-term nominal interest rate, *r  the neutral real
interest rate.  and gap stand for inflation and output gap where * is the target
inflation rate. The parameters 1.5 and 0.5 are not essential to the rule – they merely
represent Taylor’s findings for the US and therefore might vary for other countries.
The intuition of the Taylor rule is straightforward: given an equilibrium nominal
short term interest rate, consisting of the real interest rate plus the target inflation
rate, short term interest rates need to be higher whenever actual inflation is above the
target or if output is above potential output (which is equal to a positive value for the
output gap). 
A straightforward estimation of (1)’ for the ECB on the basis of eurozone aggregate
data would be problematic given our above considerations regarding the two-tier
ESCB constitution. This would be an undue simplification of the aggregation
process linking individual monetary preferences in the Governing Council with its
collective decisions. Therefore, we develop a more general framework not excluding
a priori a possible independent impact of national data.
Equation (2) represents the individual reaction function of the Taylor type for
Council member j. The standard Taylor equation (1)’ is augmented by additional
terms reflecting a possible impact of divergence in the Council member countries.
Apart from the European aggregates (superscript E) national aggregates (superscript
N) are included. 
(2) * E j E E j Et , j j E , j t N , j t t E , j t N , j t ti ( ) gap ( gap gap )             
7In this general specification there are two sources for different target interest rates
(see also Meade and Sheets, 2002): Either coefficients in (2) are not identical among
Council members and/or there is divergence in national data. Differences in
coefficients might result from differences in the national transmission mechanisms
or in inflation and output preferences.
For the sake of the exposition’s clarity let us now assume homogeneity of the
reaction functions’ coefficients among Council members: In this case (2) simplifies
to (2)’:
(2)’ *, ( ) ( )
E j E E j E
t j E t N t t E t N t ti gap gap gap             
or equivalently
(2)’’ *, ( ) ( )
E j E j
t j E N t N t E N t N ti gap gap              
We can now make a distinction between two polar cases for the decision making in
the Council:
The official hypothesis is that Council members completely ignore the regional data
and solely concentrate on the euro area aggregates. We call this the “euro area
advocates hypothesis”; in this case the divergence of national from European data
would simply drop from the reaction function:
(3) Euro area advocates: 0N N  

*
,
E E
t j E t E ti gap     
The exact opposite is the “pure national advocates hypothesis” where Council
members only look at national data; in this case we would end up with an individual
conventional reaction function where the national inflation rate and output gap
would replace the European aggregate:
(4) Pure national advocates hypothesis: E N E N,           

*
,   
j j
t j t ti gap     
The general formulation of (2)’ can thus be understood as an intermediate case
where Council members look at European aggregates but in addition take also
account of the particular development in the home country (note the coefficient
restriction E N   and E N  , becoming obvious from (2)’’).
8The different cases would also translate into different aggregate Council reaction
functions. Under the euro area advocates hypothesis this translation is
straightforward: Since each Council member’s reaction function is identical to
equation (3), this represents at the same time the ECB’s reaction function.
(5) *,
E E
t ECB E t E ti gap     
The reaction function in (5) corresponds to the world depicted by Wim Duisenberg
in his statements cited in the introduction: there is consensus and regional
developments do not matter.
The aggregation of individual preferences is more complex, however, if assumption
(3) does not hold. Depending on their national situation Governing Council
members will prefer different interest rate levels. The preferred median interest rate
would be the outcome of majority voting both for the pure national advocates
hypothesis and intermediate cases.
Given its present composition with 12 national governors, 6 board members and the
president’s double vote in split decisions, the median is the tenth position out of 19
ordered interest rate preferences, counting the presidents preference twice.1
Figure 1: The median voter theorem in ECB decisions
Note: * * *1 1 19i i ... i   . 
Thus, the more general ECB reaction function which does not exclude a priori the
independent impact of regional data is:
                                          
1 See Treaty on the European Union, Protocol no.3, Article 10, chapter 3: “...each member of the
Governing Council shall have one vote. Save as otherwise provided for in this Statute, the
Governing Council shall act by a simple majority. In the event of a tie the President shall have
the casting vote.” As the median voter theorem always assumes a stalemate, the president’s vote
is double-weighted in all cases.
*
19i
*
1i
* *
10 mediani i
9(6) * * * *, ,1 ,2 ,19 ( ,......, )t ECB t t ti median i i i 
( ) ( )E j median E E j median EE t N t t E t N t tgap gap gap       
 
     
Note that j mediant
  and j mediantgap
  do not stand for the median inflation rate and
output gap but for the median’s inflation rate and output gap. The median’s inflation
rate (output gap) might be different from the median inflation rate (output gap). 
It must be stressed that this formulation and the following empirical tests are based
on the simplifying assumption that the reaction function’s coefficients are
homogeneous among Council members. A more general formulation would,
therefore, even allow for individual coefficients ,  and  as in equation (2).
5 Descriptive analysis
To illustrate the potential empirical relevance of the national voting argument, we
calculated for each country as well as for the euro area a simple Taylor rule
assuming for all countries a real interest rate level of 2.5 percent, an inflation target
of two percent and an equal weight of 0.5 for both the inflation deviation and the
output gap. Figure 2 shows the resulting maximum, minimum and median interest
rates compared with the interest rate calculated for the euro area as a whole.
Figure 2: Taylor interest rates
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Note: Left scale in percent. Interest rates were calculated with a Taylor rule of the form
*i 2.5 0.5( 2 ) 0.5gap      . Source: Thomson Financial Datastream (see appendix for details),
own calculations.
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This simple calculation shows the divergence of interest rates across the euro area
resulting solely from differences in the national inflation and output variables. While
a higher interest rate might have been appropriate for Ireland given its booming
economy and inflation rates, a more moderate policy stance would at times have
been required for the French economy. In 2001, for example, Ireland exhibited GDP
growth of 5.9 percent and an inflation rate of 4.9 percent, while France had GDP
growth of 1.8 percent combined with an inflation rate of 1.6 percent. The continuous
difference between maximum and minimum interest rates highlights these facts and
gives rise to the suspicion that there have been considerable disagreements in the
Governing Council with regard to interest rate decisions. However, Figure 2 also
shows that the median interest rate moves quite closely with the interest rate
calculated for the euro area. Thus, although there are large divergences in the
national data, the median voter would have preferred a policy stance close to what a
Taylor rule would have recommended for the euro area as a whole. Naturally, this
limits the analysis of the influence of a regional bias in ECB decision making due to
only few discrepancies between both series. 
Figure 3: Majority distributions, EMU inflation and interest rate decisions
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Thomson Financial Datastream (see appendix for details), own calculations.
Now consider the likely path of voting majorities in the Council. Figure 3 displays
the number of votes in the Governing Council for those countries that have inflation
rates above the euro area average plus 0.25 percentage points.2 As the president’s
vote has a double-weighting in a stalemate, the total number of votes is 18 before the
                                          
2 As Meade and Sheats (2002) we assume that Council members are likely to vote in a particular
fashion only if their inflation rate differs from the euro average by a threshold of at least 0.25.
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accession of Greece and 19 thereafter (11 (12 with Greece) national governors and
six votes of the members of the Executive Board with a double-weighting of the
president’s vote). Also displayed are the EMU inflation rate and whether the ECB
decided to increase, decrease or leave interest rates unchanged.
The solid straight line indicates whether there is a majority of votes that are likely to
vote for interest rate increases (since their inflation rates are above the EMU
weighted average) and at the same time shows if EMU inflation is above the two-
percent ceiling which defines the as defined by the ECB. While the first interest rate
decrease in May 1999 as well as the subsequent series of interest rate increases
starting in December 1999 can well be justified with EMU inflation being below and
above the two-percent ceiling, it is more difficult to make sense of the period of
interest rate decreases that began in 2001 (where eurozone inflation remained clearly
above the two-percent ceiling). One possible explanation (apart from output
considerations and the exceptional circumstances surrounding September 2001)
stems from the majority distribution of votes in the Council. The number of votes
with inflation rates above the EMU inflation fell below 10 in early 2001 and thus it
can be argued that with more countries having lower inflation rates there was a
propensity in the Council towards lowering rates – even though EMU inflation
remained above the two-percent ceiling. 
Figure 4: Majority distributions, EMU output gap and interest rate decisions
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Figure 4 displays the majority distributions in the Governing Council concerning the
output gap compared with the EMU wide weighted average. Visual inspection
suggests that interest rate decisions are more in line with the EMU wide output gap
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(i.e. interest rate increases (decreases) whenever there is a positive (negative) output
gap) than with the majority distributions in the Council. During the year 2000, for
example, EMU wide output gap was positive and interest rates were increased
although the majority of Council members represented countries with a worse
economic performance than the EMU average. 
6 Econometric evidence
In contrast to studies about decision making at the Federal Reserve, we do not have
information about the voting behaviour of individual Council members due to the
lack of policy meeting minutes. As a consequence, we cannot identify specific
reaction functions of individual Council members (of the equation (2) type in section
4). Instead we have to rely on indirect conclusions from estimation of the aggregate
ECB reaction function (of the equation (6) type in section 4). Thus, the main idea of
our approach is to test whether reaction function specifications that make use of the
distance between median inflation/output gap and euro area average inflation/output
gap can be supported. 
We are applying two different empirical approaches: we first estimate modified
Taylor rules directly corresponding to the generalisation presented in chapter 4 and
second estimate a probit model with the interest rate decisions as a discrete variable.
The justification for different approaches originates from the rather short time span
available for the operation of the ECB. This means that results must be interpreted
with care and the use of different approaches serves as a measure of robustness of
our results.
6.1 Data and specifications
The sample period we use starts in January 1999 and ends in April 2002 and
includes monthly data. As a proxy for economic activity we use industrial
production, which unlike GDP figures is available on a monthly basis. In order to
create output gaps that enter the monetary policy rule we use a Hodrick-Prescott
Filter to construct a measure for potential output (smoothing parameter 14.400).
Inflation is measured using the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for
the euro area and the Harmonised Consumer Prices for each country (see appendix
for a list of data sources for each country). The interest rate used is the euro
overnight rate (Eonia) obtained from the ECB. Until the EMU entry of Greece in
January 2000 the median of the national variables was calculated on the basis of 18
national votes, thereafter on the basis of 19 votes. The country composition of the
Executive Board was unchanged during our sample period (the post of vice-
president was changed from France to Greece in June 2002). 
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Both the estimations of Taylor rules and probit models are based on three
specifications according to our differentiation in section 4. The euro advocate
specification corresponds to equation (3) and the official view that all members of
the Governing Council base their decision solely on GDP weighted eurozone
average data. The pure national advocate specification stands for equation (4) and
the other extreme where Council member solely look at data of their home country.
The intermediate rule specification assumes according to equation (2)’’ that in
addition to euro averages Council members also take account of the situation at
home.
A further variant that might be theoretical interesting turned out to be empirically
redundant: treating the members of the Executive Board as euro advocates (their
preference associated with euro area average data) and the national governors as
national advocates. This modification is empirically equivalent to the euro advocate
view since, in this set-up, the median is always a board member with his preference
based on euro averages.
Compared to the theoretical exposition in section 4 the empirical approach must
simplify in regard to the above equation (6). Since it is not possible to identify each
Council member’s individual preferences it is also not possible to identify the
median voter in the Council. The pragmatic solution we apply is to use not the
median’s but the median inflation rate and output gap. 
6.2  Reaction function 
In empirical research the original Taylor rule of the form t t t ti =α+βπ +γgap +ε  is usually
modified to include the lagged short-term interest rate in order to model interest rate
smoothing:  t t-1 t t ti =ρi +(1-ρ) α+βπ +γgap +ε  with   as the smoothing term. If a central
bank indeed pursues interest rate smoothing this means in practice that it adjusts
gradually to the interest rate prescribed by the policy rule. More refined studies on
Taylor rule estimate forward-looking versions of a Taylor rule (see e.g. Clarida et
al., 1998). While this would without doubt be appropriate for the ECB, too, the short
time span limits the ability to use more sophisticated estimation methods to account
for forward-looking behaviour. Thus, we restrict our analysis to the case where the
central bank reacts to contemporaneous inflation and output. Inflation rates enter the
reaction function with a lag of one month and output gaps with a lag of two months
to take account of the publication lags of both variables in reality.3 We use
traditional OLS analysis for the estimation.
                                          
3 Inflation rates have usually a shorter publication lag (about one month) than figures for
industrial production (about two months), hence the different lag structure.
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Table 2: Estimation results for policy reaction function
Euro Area Advocates Intermediate Rule Pure NationalAdvocates
Coef.
Std.
Error
Coef.
Std.
Error
Coef.
Std.
Error
*
t-1i 0.66*** 0.06 0.69*** 0.08 0.69*** 0.07
E
t-1π 0.20*** 0.06 0.24** 0.10
E
t-2gap 0.12*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.03
median
t-1π 0.24** 0.09
median
t-2gap 0.13*** 0.03
median E
t-1 t-1(π -π ) 0.21 0.22
median E
t-2 t-2(gap -gap ) 0.13 0.08
Long-run inflation
elasticity 1 0.59 0.77 0.77
Long-run output
gap elasticity 1 0.35 0.42 0.42
Adj. 2R 0.93 0.93 0.93
Observations 40 39 39
Notes: Sample range Jan. 1999 – Apr. 2002. Reported standard errors are Newey-West adjusted.
Significance levels: *, **, *** (10%, 5%, 1%). 1Long-run inflation and output elasticity is
calculated as /( 1 )   and /( 1 )  . 
The estimation of the euro area advocates is equal to the ordinary Taylor rules that
are already estimated in some studies. Apart from the smoothing term, both the
inflation and the output gap variable enter the equation with highly significant
positive coefficients. Thus, the ECB increases (decreases) its repo rate whenever
inflation or the output gap increase (decrease). 
Regarding our second specification, the intermediate rule, it can be seen that both
regional factor terms have positive coefficients – as expected – but are clearly
insignificant. 
In the “pure national advocates”-specification again all variables are significant and
have the correct sign. In contrast to the first specification, however, there is a higher
sensitivity both to inflation and the output gap with long-run elasticities of 0.77 and
0.42 compared with 0.59 and 0.35.
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These regressions do not allow to distinguish whether the euro area or the national
view is empirically more relevant. Both polar assumptions produce regressions with
similar explanatory power. Nevertheless, the different results for the long-run
elasticities underline that there is a severe problem of identification as long as the
question concerning a national impact cannot be answered into the one or other
direction. The different coefficients of the euro advocate and the pure national
advocate specification indicate the direction of the possible bias: If the national
advocate assumption is true regressions based on the official view produce inflation
and output gap coefficients that are biased downwards.
However, these results have to be interpreted with a fair amount of caution as the
sample period is rather short and the median variables often are not very different
from the EMU average (more precisely, the median inflation rate is above the EMU
average most of the time).
6.3 An Ordered Probit Estimation Approach
The above estimated Taylor rule models the short-term interest rate as a
continuously changing variable. In reality, however, the ECB, just like the Federal
Reserve, adjusts its repo rate in multiples of 25 basis points. Thus, it is possible to
construct a discrete variable that indicates whether the policy instrument was
increased, decreased or left unchanged. While the ECB constantly performs open
market operations that have an influence on the continuous interest rate, the discrete
changes in the repo rate are the result of voting decisions in the Governing Council
every fortnight. The ordered probit therefore presents additional information about
the variables that influence voting decisions. The dependent variable of our probit
specification takes the value of –1 (1) for months in which the ECB lowered
(increased) its repo rate and 0 for months in which the repo rate has been left
unchanged.4 As explanatory variables we use the same as for the Taylor rule
estimation in the previous chapter. Table 3 displays the coefficient estimates for our
three specifications.
                                          
4 Unlike Dueker (1999) we do not differentiate between the extent of increase or decrease
because of lack of data. Note that our sample does not contain months with multiple interest
rate decisions, hence the construction of a monthly discrete variable seems appropriate. See
appendix for an overview of ECB interest rate changes. See Greene (2000), chapter 19 for an
illustration of the ordered probit model. 
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Table 3: Coefficient estimates for ordered probit
Euro Area Advocates Intermediate Rule Pure NationalAdvocates
Coef.
Std.
Error
Coef.
Std.
Error
Coef.
Std.
Error
*
t-1i -2.33*** 0.75 -2.66*** 0.90 -2.63*** 0.80
E
t-1π 1.37** 0.65 2.35*** 0.85
E
t-2gap 0.95*** 0.28 1.24*** 0.42
median
t-1π 1.27*** 0.39
median
t-2gap 2.24*** 0.82
median E
t-1 t-1(π -π ) 3.77* 1.96
median E
t-2 t-2(gap -gap ) 1.23* 0.65
1 -7.53*** -6.20** -6.59***
2 -4.57*** -2.35 -2.92**
 2Pseudo R 0.25 0.37 0.36
Observations 40 39 39
Notes: Sample range Jan. 1999 – Apr. 2002; Significance levels: *, **, *** (10%, 5%, 1%). 
As in the previous Taylor rule estimation, all three variables (lagged interest rate,
inflation rate and output gap) exhibit highly significant coefficients in the first
specification. The lagged interest rate enters the equation with a negative sign,
indicating that a higher interest rate in the previous month decreases the probability
of an interest rate increase this month (and increases the probability of an interest
rate decline). As expected, both coefficients for the inflation rate and the output gap
are positive, indicating an increased probability of an interest rate increase the higher
both variables are. 
Regarding the intermediate rule, both regional factors are significant at the ten
percent level with the correct signs. Thus, according to the probit estimation the
hypothesis of a regional influence is weakly supported for the intermediate
specification. This stands in contrast to the results for the Taylor rule. A further
support for the impact of regional divergence comes from the pure national
advocates regression which compared to the euro area advocate regression is
characterised by a larger explanatory power. 
Table 4 displays the marginal effects for each variable and specification, i.e. the
change in the probability of each category for a one unit (i.e. percentage point)
17
change in the explanatory variable calculated for mean values of explanatory
variables.  This allows us to interpret and compare the impact that a small change of
each variable has on the voting decision. 
Table 4: Marginal effects
Euro Area Advocates Intermediate Rule Pure NationalAdvocates
Prob(y=...) Prob(y=...) Prob(y=...)
-1 0 1 -1 0 1 -1 0 1
*
t-1i 0.25 0.13 -0.38 0.13 0.09 -0.21 0.14 0.13 -0.27
E
t-1π -0.15 -0.08 0.22 -0.11 -0.08 0.19
E
t-2gap -0.1 -0.05 0.16 -0.06 -0.04 0.1
median
t-1π -0.12 -0.11 0.23
median
t-2gap -0.07 -0.06 0.13
median E
t-1 t-1(π -π ) -0.18 -0.13 0.3
median E
t-2 t-2(gap -gap ) -0.06 -0.04 0.1
Note: The marginal effects in each category sum to zero (see Greene (2000), p.878).
A rise in the eurozone inflation rate by one percentage point increases the
probability for a tightening of monetary policy by 0.22. The same result applies to
an increase in the median inflation rate with a marginal effect of 0.23. However, the
probability of a rate rise is increased by 0.3 if the difference between the eurozone
and the median inflation rate increases. This shows that the neglect of the regional
dimension can lead to an underestimation of the probability of an interest rate
increase decision of the ECB Council. The same applies to the output gap with a
marginal effect of 0.1 for the divergence between median and eurozone data.
However, the impact of a regional dimension seems to be quantitatively more
important for inflation rates than for output gaps.
7 Conclusions
Our descriptive and anecdotal analyses have produced some weak evidence for an
impact of regional divergence in ECB decision making. The econometric analyses
have led to two important results concerning the impact of national data:
First, while we were not able to clearly state whether a euro advocate or a pure
national view dominates the voting in the ECB Council, our results contained
different coefficients for both specifications. Thus, conventional Taylor rules that
rely solely on eurozone variables might be biased. Second, however, according to
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the results of the ordered probit we found weak evidence for the hypothesis that
ECB Council members take into account divergences of national data from eurozone
averages. The results also suggest that the impact of regional data is more
pronounced for inflation than for output considerations (this is also supported by the
descriptive analysis).
Of course, the analysis suffers from some limitations: the most important one results
from the short time span of data for the era of ECB responsibility. This short time
span also explains why more sophisticated specifications for the reaction function
like forward looking estimations cannot yet be applied. 
Even though time will bring more observations this will not overcome all
identification problems. As long as observers have no further insights into ECB
Council decision making this will preclude a definite conclusion on the relevance of
regional divergence and different national monetary preferences in the Council.
There are many good arguments in favour and against the publication of minutes
from ECB Council sessions. Our considerations, however, show that such a better
view into the ‘black box’ ECB Council would help ECB observers to find a more
reliable specification for modelling ECB decision making. This would make
monetary policy more predictable. 
Our results also stress the importance of the ongoing debate on the optimum ESCB
constitution after enlargement. Heterogeneity in economic structure, development
and monetary preferences is likely to increase considerably with the EMU entry of
small and medium sized countries from Eastern Europe. If for EMU-12 there is
some evidence that divergence is not irrelevant in the Governing Council this should
be even more pronounced for EMU-27. In this sense our first results back the case
for adjusting the representation and/or voting weights in the Governing Council in
favour of the countries with large GDP shares. 
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Data Appendix
1. Data source
Country Inflation rates Industrial production
Austria IMF (OEI64H..F) OECD (OEOPR035G)
Belgium IMF (BGI64H..F) I.N.S.E.E. 1) (BGIP7500G)
EMU Eurostat (EMESHARM%) OECD (EMOPR035G)
Finland IMF (FNI64H..F) IMF (FNI66..IG)
France IMF (FRI64H..F) IMF (FRI66..IG)
Germany IMF (BDI64H..F) OECD (BDOPR035G)
Greece IMF (GRI64H..F) OECD (GROPR035G)
Ireland CSO3) (IRCPIEU.F) OECD (IROPR035G)
Italy IMF (ITI64H..F) ISTAT2) (ITINPRODG)
Luxembourg IMF (LXI64H..F) OECD (LXOPR035G)
Portugal OECD (PTOCP049F) OECD (PTOPR035G)
Spain IMF (ESI64H..F) IMF (ESI66..IG)
The Netherlands IMF (NLI64H..F) IMF (NLI66..IG)
Notes: Datastream Mnemonics in parentheses. 1) Institut National de la Statistique et des Études,
France, 2) Instituto Nazionale di Statistica, Italy, 3) Central Statistics Office, Ireland. IMF =
International Financial Statistics. All industrial production series are seasonally adjusted.
2. ECB interest rate changes
Date Repo rate level
8 April 1999 -50 bp 2.50
4 November 1999 +50 bp 3.00
3 February 2000 +25 bp 3.25
16 March 2000 +25 bp 3.50
27 April 2000 +25 bp 3.75
8 June 2000 +50 bp 4.25
31 August 2000 +25 bp 4.50
5 October 2000 +25 bp 4.75
10 May 2001 -25 bp 4.50
30 August 2001 -25 bp 4.25
17 September 2001 -50 bp 3.75
8 November 2001 -50 bp 3.25
Source: European Central Bank.
